Thursday, June 18

Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida

*Thirty-fourth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida * Important Excerpts of the Report · There is heightened concern among Member States about the terrorist threat emanating regionally from Afghanistan from ISIL-K and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP, QDe.132) in particular; new inward travel to Afghanistan of some Al-Qaida (QDe.004) personnel and training, recruitment and reorganization activities. · The terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan is causing heightened concern in many Member States. In addition to ISIL-K external operations, the scale and ambition of TTP operations into Pakistan have increased. Member States have noted inward travel of well-established Al-Qaida figures, notably in connection with training activities. Continued reorganization and training are judged indicative of the group’s longer-term intent. · Member States registered ongoing concern that terrorism emanating from Afghanistan will be a driver of insecurity in the region and further afield in most scenarios. ISIL-K remains the most serious threat in the region projecting terror beyond Afghanistan, while Al-Qaida (QDe.004) exercises strategic patience, prioritizing its relationship with the Taliban. Despite Taliban attempts to exercise control over Al-Qaida, greater collaboration among Al-Qaida affiliates and TTP could transform the latter into an “extra-regional threat”. · Some Member States estimate that ISIL-K has increased from 4,000 to 6,000 fighters, despite the loss of territory and attrition among leadership, while others assess its strength remaining at between 2,000 and 3,500 fighters. The ISIL-K strategy of embedding covertly in Al-Qaida-affiliated groups makes it difficult to estimate accurate figures and to which group fighters are loyal. Sanaullah Ghafari (QDi.431) remains the leader; Abu Ahmad al-Madani (Iraqi, not listed) commands the external operations unit of ISIL-K, active in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces, northern Afghanistan and Iran. · ISIL-K has improved its financial and logistical capabilities and intensified recruitment efforts. Qari Rafi Ullah (Afghan, not listed) manages the group’s finances in Afghanistan, while Abu Tamim al-Kurdi (not listed) leads the Al-Siddiq office. One way ISIL-K receives money is from Somalia via Yemen, facilitated by the Al-Karrar office, to connect the ISIL-K leadership with new Central Asian recruits. Online recruitment and radicalization efforts focusing on Tajik and, to a lesser extent, Uzbek communities encourage potential recruits to conduct attacks outside Afghanistan. Principal routes to Afghanistan for new recruits involve travel from Central Asia through Türkiye and Iran. · ISIL-K has relocated some personnel away from its core area of Kunar and Nangarhar, with factions migrating to Badakhshan, Herat and Nimroz Provinces, adopting an asymmetric warfare strategy better suited to local conditions and to resist Taliban pressure. ISIL-K operational units are highly compartmentalized to preserve the group’s resilience despite continual losses. The group aspires to control Afghan territory from which to infiltrate neighbouring countries, expanding the terrorist threat to Central Asia, the Russian Federation and Iran. · In response to high attrition rates, ISIL-K has limited high-impact operations within Afghanistan to soft targets (i.e. Taliban fighters queuing in front of a bank office in Kandahar and Western tourists in Bamiyan), and has focused on external operations, encouraging members of the Central Asian diaspora to travel to Europe and the Russian Federation, as well as other countries. · Several Member States assessed that while ISIL core claimed responsibility for the Kerman and Moscow attacks, ISIL-K provided fighters, funds and training to the perpetrators of both actions. · ISIL-K perceives the Taliban as an ideological enemy and opposes the notion of a Pashtun-centric Taliban governance. The group’s narrative aims to reduce the Taliban’s credibility among the Afghan population and trigger sectarian fault lines, promoting the idea that the Taliban has deviated from Islamic principles, while portraying itself as advancing the “wider Khorasan”. · Member States consider that in the short term, ISIL-K will preserve battle-readiness, increase revenue generation, and enhance recruitment by attracting renegades from other terrorist groups and the Taliban. ISIL-K also recruits disaffected individuals unknown to security and intelligence services. In the midterm, the group will continue low-impact attacks, combined with sporadic high-impact operations against soft targets to boost the group’s media propaganda, undermine economic and political interests, and humiliate the Taliban. In the long term, the group will strive to drag Afghanistan into turmoil and gain and hold territorial control while expanding to northern regional countries and beyond. · The status, location, and strength of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan have not changed, remaining dormant. Al-Qaida remains strictly hierarchical, with Sayf al-Adl the de facto leader; affiliates enjoy greater operational autonomy but still seek leaders’ authorization on critical decisions. · Despite lacking current capacity to conduct large-scale operations externally, Al-Qaida seeks to strengthen cooperation with regional terrorist organizations of non-Afghan origin, such as ETIM/TIP, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QDe.010) and Jamaat Ansarullah (JA, not listed) for expansion to Central Asia. The group covertly continues its reorganization and training activities, as well as new inward travel from the Middle East through Mashhad and Zabol towards Afghanistan through Zaranj in Nimroz Province and Islam Qalah and Torghundi in Herat Province. · Several Member States noted the recent arrival in Kunar and Nuristan of ethnic Arab Al-Qaida commanders who operated in Afghanistan previously and had historical linkages with the Taliban, as well as the presence of Abu Hamza al-Anbari al-Iraqi (not listed) in Wardak and Sar-e Pul Provinces. AQAP members, Abd al-Qadir al-Masri (not listed) and Ali Umar al-Kurdi (not listed), reportedly migrated to Afghanistan from Yemen. Abdelazim Ben Ali (Libyan, not listed) is an adviser of the Taliban Acting Minister of the Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani (TAi.144). · TTP has an estimated strength of between 6,000 and 6,500 fighters, accompanied by approximately 14,000 family members. Noor Wali Mehsud (QDi.427) remains the leader, with Qari Amjad (not listed) reported to be his deputy. · With Taliban acquiescence, and at times support, TTP has intensified attacks inside Pakistan (more than 800 attacks during the reporting period), primarily targeting military installations. TTP camps with Al-Qaida and Taliban involvement focus on training local Afghan fighters and TTP operatives. Several Member States report that the Al-Qaida figure Abu Ikhlas-al Masri (not listed) is actively collaborating with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (QDe.152) in providing suicide bomber training to TTP in Kunar Province. Two Member States noted the responsibility of TTP for the 26 March attack against Chinese nationals working on a hydropower dam project near Besham in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan. There is increased support and collaboration between TTP and the Taliban, sharing manpower and training camps in Afghanistan and conducting more lethal attacks under the banner of Tehrik-e Jihad Pakistan (TJP, not listed). Therefore, TTP could transform into an umbrella organization for other terrorist groups. In the medium term, a potential merger of TTP and AQIS could escalate the threat against Pakistan, and eventually India, Myanmar and Bangladesh. · There has been little change in the status of ETIM/TIP in Afghanistan since the Monitoring Team’s most recent report. ETIM/TIP and Jaish-al-Adl (not listed) are reported to have jointly planned and executed attacks on Chinese interests in Pakistan. Several Member States have expressed concern about ISIL-K efforts to recruit ETIM/TIP cadres, especially if curbed by the Taliban. · Two Member States note the claims of responsibility by Majeed Brigade for the 2 March attack on Gwadar Port Complex and 26 March attack on Naval Air Base Turbat in Pakistan, intended as a warning to foreign investors to withdraw completely. One Member State reported that Al-Qaida promoted cooperation between TTP and Majeed Brigade, while another expressed concern that any future nexus between TTP, Majeed Brigade and ISIL-K in Afghanistan could increase attacks in Balochistan and Sindh, Pakistan. · The situation in Afghanistan is more concerning. Several Member States note an increase in travelers of Arab and Central Asian nationalities to Afghanistan, and some Indian nationals. Some Central Asians are believed to have travelled from Syria. Some were reported to join the Katiba Umer Farooq and Al-Qaida “commanders” were also noted to arrive in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces. This is a new development noted by intelligence and security services. · TTP continues to use NATO-calibre and other weapons obtained in Afghanistan to target Pakistani military border posts. One Member State emphasizes the role of night vision capability in this regard. Al-Qaida is funding purchases of weapons and suicide vests for TTP. The pakistan times Important Excerpts of the Report

· There is heightened concern among Member States about the terrorist threat emanating regionally from Afghanistan from ISIL-K and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP, QDe.132) in particular; new inward travel to Afghanistan of some Al-Qaida (QDe.004) personnel and training, recruitment and reorganization activities.

· The terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan is causing heightened concern in many Member States. In addition to ISIL-K external operations, the scale and ambition of TTP operations into Pakistan have increased. Member States have noted inward travel of well-established Al-Qaida figures, notably in connection with training activities. Continued reorganization and training are judged indicative of the group’s longer-term intent.

· Member States registered ongoing concern that terrorism emanating from Afghanistan will be a driver of insecurity in the region and further afield in most scenarios. ISIL-K remains the most serious threat in the region projecting terror beyond Afghanistan, while Al-Qaida (QDe.004) exercises strategic patience, prioritizing its relationship with the Taliban. Despite Taliban attempts to exercise control over Al-Qaida, greater collaboration among Al-Qaida affiliates and TTP could transform the latter into an “extra-regional threat”.

· Some Member States estimate that ISIL-K has increased from 4,000 to 6,000 fighters, despite the loss of territory and attrition among leadership, while others assess its strength remaining at between 2,000 and 3,500 fighters. The ISIL-K strategy of embedding covertly in Al-Qaida-affiliated groups makes it difficult to estimate accurate figures and to which group fighters are loyal. Sanaullah Ghafari (QDi.431) remains the leader; Abu Ahmad al-Madani (Iraqi, not listed) commands the external operations unit of ISIL-K, active in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces, northern Afghanistan and Iran.

· ISIL-K has improved its financial and logistical capabilities and intensified recruitment efforts. Qari Rafi Ullah (Afghan, not listed) manages the group’s finances in Afghanistan, while Abu Tamim al-Kurdi (not listed) leads the Al-Siddiq office. One way ISIL-K receives money is from Somalia via Yemen, facilitated by the Al-Karrar office, to connect the ISIL-K leadership with new Central Asian recruits. Online recruitment and radicalization efforts focusing on Tajik and, to a lesser extent, Uzbek communities encourage potential recruits to conduct attacks outside Afghanistan. Principal routes to Afghanistan for new recruits involve travel from Central Asia through Türkiye and Iran.

· ISIL-K has relocated some personnel away from its core area of Kunar and Nangarhar, with factions migrating to Badakhshan, Herat and Nimroz Provinces, adopting an asymmetric warfare strategy better suited to local conditions and to resist Taliban pressure. ISIL-K operational units are highly compartmentalized to preserve the group’s resilience despite continual losses. The group aspires to control Afghan territory from which to infiltrate neighbouring countries, expanding the terrorist threat to Central Asia, the Russian Federation and Iran.

· In response to high attrition rates, ISIL-K has limited high-impact operations within Afghanistan to soft targets (i.e. Taliban fighters queuing in front of a bank office in Kandahar and Western tourists in Bamiyan), and has focused on external operations, encouraging members of the Central Asian diaspora to travel to Europe and the Russian Federation, as well as other countries.

· Several Member States assessed that while ISIL core claimed responsibility for the Kerman and Moscow attacks, ISIL-K provided fighters, funds and training to the perpetrators of both actions.

· ISIL-K perceives the Taliban as an ideological enemy and opposes the notion of a Pashtun-centric Taliban governance. The group’s narrative aims to reduce the Taliban’s credibility among the Afghan population and trigger sectarian fault lines, promoting the idea that the Taliban has deviated from Islamic principles, while portraying itself as advancing the “wider Khorasan”.

· Member States consider that in the short term, ISIL-K will preserve battle-readiness, increase revenue generation, and enhance recruitment by attracting renegades from other terrorist groups and the Taliban. ISIL-K also recruits disaffected individuals unknown to security and intelligence services. In the midterm, the group will continue low-impact attacks, combined with sporadic high-impact operations against soft targets to boost the group’s media propaganda, undermine economic and political interests, and humiliate the Taliban. In the long term, the group will strive to drag Afghanistan into turmoil and gain and hold territorial control while expanding to northern regional countries and beyond.

· The status, location, and strength of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan have not changed, remaining dormant. Al-Qaida remains strictly hierarchical, with Sayf al-Adl the de facto leader; affiliates enjoy greater operational autonomy but still seek leaders’ authorization on critical decisions.

· Despite lacking current capacity to conduct large-scale operations externally, Al-Qaida seeks to strengthen cooperation with regional terrorist organizations of non-Afghan origin, such as ETIM/TIP, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QDe.010) and Jamaat Ansarullah (JA, not listed) for expansion to Central Asia. The group covertly continues its reorganization and training activities, as well as new inward travel from the Middle East through Mashhad and Zabol towards Afghanistan through Zaranj in Nimroz Province and Islam Qalah and Torghundi in Herat Province.

· Several Member States noted the recent arrival in Kunar and Nuristan of ethnic Arab Al-Qaida commanders who operated in Afghanistan previously and had historical linkages with the Taliban, as well as the presence of Abu Hamza al-Anbari al-Iraqi (not listed) in Wardak and Sar-e Pul Provinces. AQAP members, Abd al-Qadir al-Masri (not listed) and Ali Umar al-Kurdi (not listed), reportedly migrated to Afghanistan from Yemen. Abdelazim Ben Ali (Libyan, not listed) is an adviser of the Taliban Acting Minister of the Interior, Sirajuddin Haqqani (TAi.144).

· TTP has an estimated strength of between 6,000 and 6,500 fighters, accompanied by approximately 14,000 family members. Noor Wali Mehsud (QDi.427) remains the leader, with Qari Amjad (not listed) reported to be his deputy.

· With Taliban acquiescence, and at times support, TTP has intensified attacks inside Pakistan (more than 800 attacks during the reporting period), primarily targeting military installations. TTP camps with Al-Qaida and Taliban involvement focus on training local Afghan fighters and TTP operatives. Several Member States report that the Al-Qaida figure Abu Ikhlas-al Masri (not listed) is actively collaborating with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (QDe.152) in providing suicide bomber training to TTP in Kunar Province. Two Member States noted the responsibility of TTP for the 26 March attack against Chinese nationals working on a hydropower dam project near Besham in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan. There is increased support and collaboration between TTP and the Taliban, sharing manpower and training camps in Afghanistan and conducting more lethal attacks under the banner of Tehrik-e Jihad Pakistan (TJP, not listed). Therefore, TTP could transform into an umbrella organization for other terrorist groups. In the medium term, a potential merger of TTP and AQIS could escalate the threat against Pakistan, and eventually India, Myanmar and Bangladesh.

· There has been little change in the status of ETIM/TIP in Afghanistan since the Monitoring Team’s most recent report. ETIM/TIP and Jaish-al-Adl (not listed) are reported to have jointly planned and executed attacks on Chinese interests in Pakistan. Several Member States have expressed concern about ISIL-K efforts to recruit ETIM/TIP cadres, especially if curbed by the Taliban.

· Two Member States note the claims of responsibility by Majeed Brigade for the 2 March attack on Gwadar Port Complex and 26 March attack on Naval Air Base Turbat in Pakistan, intended as a warning to foreign investors to withdraw completely. One Member State reported that Al-Qaida promoted cooperation between TTP and Majeed Brigade, while another expressed concern that any future nexus between TTP, Majeed Brigade and ISIL-K in Afghanistan could increase attacks in Balochistan and Sindh, Pakistan.

· The situation in Afghanistan is more concerning. Several Member States note an increase in travelers of Arab and Central Asian nationalities to Afghanistan, and some Indian nationals. Some Central Asians are believed to have travelled from Syria. Some were reported to join the Katiba Umer Farooq and Al-Qaida “commanders” were also noted to arrive in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces. This is a new development noted by intelligence and security services.

· TTP continues to use NATO-calibre and other weapons obtained in Afghanistan to target Pakistani military border posts. One Member State emphasizes the role of night vision capability in this regard. Al-Qaida is funding purchases of weapons and suicide vests for TTP.