16 February 2024, New York: Thank you, Co-Chairs, for convening these discussions on the clusters. We had felt that perhaps we should have focused on the clusters rather than models because this is where we would want to address the divergence and try to bridge the differences to conclude the Security Council reform. But now having a discussion, all 5 clusters together, it is inevitable that most of us will repeat ourselves and this may be old wine in new bottles. But we must make sure that we are not serving vinegar. I think that our discussion here should, therefore, address the issues that are at stake.
Co-Chairs, All five clusters, as we know, are interlinked. When we adopted decision 62/557, the President of the General Assembly in 2007 set out certain principles, which should guide the further work of this process. Among these principles, I would just like to mention the following:
• Security Council reform is an integral part of strengthening the United Nations. We have to promote this hand in hand with the transformation of the entire UN system.
• Secondly, further steps should contain components and notions, and I quote, “that will allow the membership to reach general agreement”. General agreement on all aspects of the Security Council, which means the five clusters;
• Thirdly, the President of the Assembly, also introducing the decision, stated that we must accommodate the interests and concerns of all sides, especially those who are currently under-represented, so the issue of equity and geographical representation; and
• Finally, he also stated that the reform steps that we take here should not undermine the momentum and the consensus which exists on this process, and therefore, it is important for us to bear that in mind when considering the proposals and initiatives that are presented here.
Co-Chairs, On categories, the UfC position is well known. We oppose any proposal for additional permanent members; there is no justification for ‘new centers of privilege’, a violation of the principle of sovereign equality. Any country seeking frequent presence on the Security Council or any country seeking more permanent membership should be subjected to the democratic process of periodic election by the General Assembly, and by the way, this applies even more to the largest democracy in the world. The largest democracy in the world should not seek to undermine democracy by seeking permanent membership. It should be contrary to those principles.
Co-Chairs, It is essential to recall that what we had discussed with regard to the categories does not apply to one category. There are several forms of membership: 2-year non-permanent seats; longer-term non-permanent seats; re-electable non-permanent seats; permanent seats representing regions, permanent seats representing the individual state; membership, permanent membership with or without a veto or variation on the form of membership. There are not 2 categories; there are several categories we have to discuss, and I find it facile for some to argue that since the Charter only speaks about permanent and non-permanent, we have only 2 categories that we can only talk about. That is not true. If we are going to amend the Charter, it is up to us to create new categories; or delete other categories.
Co-Chairs, On the veto again there are various points of view, prohibition, veto, restriction, suspension and expansion. Regional representation, and here I think our discussions have focused a lot on this over the last two days. The UfC and the African group have proposed specific models for regional representation. In our view, the historical injustice is done against Africa as well as Asia, Latin America, the CIDS, the Arab countries and the OIC countries I may add, must be redressed. And the unequal advantage accorded to Europe in the current composition and the proposed composition from the G-4 and L-69—that advantage has to be rectified, and that must be part of the proposals.
We agree with the proposition that the global south must have a stronger voice. Of course, this stronger voice from the global south cannot count on 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 self-appointed representatives who want to be permanently on the Security Council. Nobody has given them the mantle of leadership in the global south. The global south today is led by Uganda as the Chair of the Group of 77 and the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. No one else has the mantle to say that we are the global south or that we represent the global south, no matter how large the population is. I think it’s an overreach, in my view, to give the example of the Group of 20 (G-20) as something that should be emulated in the reform of the Security Council. I think the G-20 is the self-appointed group of elite countries, and most of the members of the global south are not there. The African Union was admitted as one entity, and there are 54 African countries. They will not represent the institution; only the African Union will. As such, it’s a good step. But I do not think that the General Assembly, in reforming the Security Council, should try to emulate the G-20. That would be undemocratic and inequitable as such.
Co-Chairs, The UFC’s proposal to add 11 or 12 new non-permanent members would offer greater representation to the vast majority of the global south. 59 of them have never served on the Security Council. On the other hand, four or six new permanent members would statistically reduce the prospects of representation for the rest of the 182 UN member states. Besides ensuring equitable geographical representation, a larger number of non-permanent members could balance the inordinate influence of the five permanent members, including through the larger number of votes that will be required to adopt decisions in the Security Council. Today, in the 15-member council, you require 9 votes. In the 27-member Council, you will require 17 votes, and most of these votes will be from developing countries. There will be 6 or 7 votes from Africa, 6 from Asia, and 4 from Latin America. We have the majority in the Security Council. The global South will have the majority in the Security Council if we adopt the UfC model. Moreover, the periodic election of non-permanent members would ensure both the requirements of accountability as well as the democratization of the Council and the United Nations.
Co-Chairs, We consider the African demand for two permanent seats on the continent of Africa to be very different from the quest of the four individual states for permanent membership. The two African seats would be filled by states selected by Africa and accountable to Africa, and presumably could be replaced by Africa. We are willing to work with our African colleagues to explore how their demands can be accommodated, and I am happy to have heard from other groups like the L-69 and G-20 about their willingness to consider mechanisms for the nomination and rotation of Security Council members from regional groups. I think this is something that we can explore.
But I would also agree with my colleague from Bahrain that we need to consider how the mechanism of cross-regional representation would work. And here I would merely add this clause on behalf of Pakistan: that this cross-regional representation should also include the OIC countries, which are members of the United Nations. And together with Arab countries, the other OIC countries also deserve representation, and there should be a mechanism for how we can do that.
Co-Chairs, The four individual aspirants, the G-4, on the other hand, would seek membership in the Council based on their national capacity, and therefore presumably they would be advancing their national interests and ambitions. If they are not, if they are seeking to represent their regions or the global south, then they should be selected by those regions and by the global south. They cannot just presume to say that I am the global south; I represent the global south, and therefore, since I am a big country, I want to be permanently on the Security Council. Nobody gave them this mandate, and no one should give them this mandate because it is undemocratic.
11. It should be for all of us to represent the global south. The four would not be sponsored by the regional groups nor be accountable to any region. But going beyond that, I would say that the logic based on which the claims of the 4 have been advanced is that we are large countries, we can contribute to peace and security, to peacekeeping, and we can influence the world. I would say that if that is what has motivated them, there are not 4 countries, or 6 countries, that qualify. The number of large militarily significant, politically significant, and geopolitically significant countries is well over twenty among the members of the United Nations. While leaving out Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, which, by the way, have made a greater contribution to stopping the Ukraine conflict than any of the four permanent members Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Mexico, Argentina, Italy, Spain, Poland, Bangladesh, and my own country, how are we less qualified than the four who have put forward their names for permanent membership?
The UfC’s offer for longer-term seats and co-chairs would accommodate the requirements of such large states which are more than 20. It would also accommodate the aspirations and contributions of smaller states, and here, let me recall, since the contributions of Kuwait who were on the Council, we know their contributions. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Malta, and the UAE have made outstanding contributions to the work of the Security Council, which are well within the meaning of Article 23.1 of the Charter. We do not have to be a big country to fall within the ambit of Article 23.1 of the Charter. Any country that has the willingness and commitment to follow the principles of the UN Charter can make that contribution.
Co-Chairs, Lastly, although considerable progress has been made in promoting convergence in the Council’s working methods, several additional issues still need to be discussed. It is therefore evident that we will require substantive discussion and not just one session to discuss the five clusters. I hope we will find the time at this session or next session to address the five clusters, reach an agreement to reduce the divergences, maximize the convergences, and reach a model on which we can all agree, and that is when we will be able to put down a text and begin to negotiate the adoption of the text. But we still need to follow this path first.
Co-Chairs, On your two specific questions, let me say that, first of all, on behalf of my delegation, the review clause can be considered if it will contribute to making the Council more efficient and effective, and we can consider it if it can allow a compromise on regional representation. I have already spoken at length about the selection and rotation of cross-regional issues. In Pakistan’s view, there should be one member from the Arab group and one member from the OIC group on the Council at all times, perhaps rotating between Asia and Africa.
Co-Chairs, The UfC and my country remain open to frank and detailed discussions; we heard some positive moves during this discussion. I hope we will be able to take advantage of these positive moves, but our guiding principle must remain that we must reach the ‘widest possible’ agreement among UN members; in our view, that implies a consensus, and we hope that we will move toward that goal under your very able guidance.
Sub Editor: Ghufran